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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31-12.

Confirmation of award.

Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration
proceeding for the confirmation of the award, and 20 days notice to
all parties, the court shall confirm the award unless a motion is
timely filed to vacate or modify the award.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14.

Vacation of the award by court.

(1) Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration
proceeding for vacation of the award, the court shall vacate the
award if it appears:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
other undue means;
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed
partiality, or an arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that
prejudiced the rights of any party;
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause shown, refused to hear evidence material to
the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to the
substantial prejudice of the rights of a party; or
(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the
parties to the arbitration proceeding.
(2) A motion to vacate an award shall be made to the court
within 20 days after a copy of the award is served upon the moving
party, or if predicated upon corruption, fraud, or other undue
means, within 2 0 days after the grounds are known or should have
been known.
(3) If an award is vacated on grounds other than in
Subsection (1)(e), the court may order a rehearing before new
arbitrators chosen as provided in the arbitration agreement or by
the court.
Arbitrators chosen by the court shall be found
qualified to arbitrate the issues involved. The time for making an
award, if specified in the arbitration agreement, is applicable to
a rearbitration proceedings. If not specified, the court shall
order the award upon rearbitration to be made within a reasonable
time.
The time for making an award under a rearbitration
proceeding commences on the date of the court's order for
rearbitration.
(4) If the motion to vacate is denied and no motion to modify
or correct the award is pending, the court shall confirm the award.

DETERMINATIVE COURT RULE
Rule 4-501 Code of Judicial Administration.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a
hearing unless ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as
provided in paragraphs 3(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any issues in the action on the merits
with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a
written request for hearing.
* * * *

(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the
time the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the
motion shall be deemed waived.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered four true and correct
copies of APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF DISPOSITIVE STATUTES AND RULES to
Mr. Thomas T. Billings and Mr. Jon E. Waddoups, VanCott, Bagley,
Cornwall & McCarthy, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84145 this 30th day of September, 1992.
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II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Order that is the subject of this appeal is a final
order and judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Summit
County. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).

Pursuant to Utah R.

App. P. 42 the Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the
Court of Appeals for disposition by order dated August 26, 1992.
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did Appellant waive its rights to challenge the

arbitration award the trial court confirmed?
Because the resolution of this issue involves the review
of written materials only, this Court reviews the evidence de novo.
Matter of Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah
App. 1988).
B.

Should this Court summarily affirm the trial court

because Appellant failed to marshal evidence in its brief?
Because this issue involves the contents of an appellate
brief, this Court addresses it for the first time, and as a matter
of discretion. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.. 746 P.2d 1182,
1185 (Utah App. 1987).

-1-

C.

Should this Court summarily affirm the trial court

because Appellant failed to comply with Utah R. App. P. 24(a)?
Because this issue involves the contents of an appellate
brief, this Court addresses it for the first time, and as a matter
of discretion. Koulis v, Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 746 P.2d 1182,
1185 (Utah App. 1987).
D.

Did the trial court err in concluding there was no

competent evidence of fraud before it?
Because the resolution of this issue involves the review
of written materials only, this Court reviews the evidence de novo.
Matter of Adoption of Infant Anonymous. 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah
App. 1988).
E. Did the trial court err in refusing to reconsider the
damages the Arbitrator awarded Appellee?
This Court reviews the trial court's interpretation of
statutes such as the Utah Arbitration Act as a question of law.
Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton. McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P.2d
34, 37 (Utah App. 1990).

Neither this Court or the trial court

can, however, review the merits of the underlying arbitration award
the trial court confirmed.

City of Fairbanks Mun. Util. System v.

Lees, 705 P.2d 457, 460 (Alas. 1985);

Arizona Public Serv. Co. v.

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 149 Ariz. 239, 717 P.2d 918, 92223 (App. 1985); Foust v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 786 P.2d 450, 451
2

(Colo, App. 1989); Harris v, Haucrht, 435 So.2d 926, 928 (Fla. App.
1983); Jackson Trak Group v. Mid States Port Auth., 242 Kan. 683,
751 P.2d 122, 127 (1988); Taunton Mun. Light Plant Comm'n v.
Geiringer & Assoc., 560 F.Supp. 1249, 1252 (D. Mass.), aff'd. 725
F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1983)(applying Massachusetts codification of
Uniform Arbitration Act); Bvron Center Public Schools v. Kent
County Educ. Ass'n., 186 Mich. App. 29, 463 N.W.2d 112, 113 (App.
1990); Beebout v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 271,
273 (Minn. App. 1985); Holman v. Trans World Airlines. 737 F.Supp.
527, 530 (E.D. Mo. 1989)(applying Missouri codification of Uniform
Arbitration Act); Glasgow Educ. Ass'n. v. Board of Trustees, Valley
County, 242 Mont. 478, 791 P.2d 1367, 1371 (1990); Turner v.
Nicholson Properties, Inc., 80 N.C. App. 208, 341 S.E.2d 42, 45
(App.) disc, review denied. 317 N.C. 714, 347 S.E.2d 457 (1986);
Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical
Johnstown

Area

Vocational-Technical

Educ.

School v. Greater
Ass'n.,

88

Pa.

Commonwealth Ct. 141, 489 A.2d 945, 948 n.4 (1985).
F.

Did the trial court err in ruling the election of

remedies doctrine is inapplicable to this matter?
Because the resolution of this issue involves the review
of written materials only, this Court reviews the evidence de novo.
Matter of Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah
App. 1988).
3

IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE.

Petitioner/Appellee Arthur Mintz, Trustee of the Mintz
Family

Trust

("Trust"),

filed

his

Verified

Petition

for

Confirmation of Arbitration Award (the "Petition") on October 10,
1991.

In the Petition, Trust requested confirmation of a May 30,

1991 arbitration award (the "Award") against Respondent/Appellant
Marc Development

("Development").

The amount of the Award is

$188,500, plus interest from March 28, 1991.

Development never

sought to vacate the May 30, 1991 Award until it filed its November
21, 1991 Reply to Trust's Petition,
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

On January 16, 1992 Trust filed its Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings (the "Motion"). (R. 19-20).

After the parties

fully briefed the Motion (R. 22-30; 36-64; 80-106), Trust filed its
Notice

to

Submit

Motion

for

Decision

(R.

120-21).

concurrently filed its Affidavit of Attorney Fees,

Trust

(R. 107-14).

After the parties filed all memoranda and the Notice to
Submit, Development filed an untimely Request for Oral Argument.
(R. 115-16).
it.

Trust objected to that request and moved to strike

(R. 117-19).

The trial court granted Trust's Motion without

a hearing. (R. 122). It awarded Trust its attorneys' fees, subject
to Development's objection and the court's review.
4

(R. 122).

Pursuant to the trial court's ruling, Trust filed a
proposed Order and Judgment and served it on opposing counsel. (R.
155) .

Development objected to that proposed order and judgment

(R.128-41), and requested oral argument on its objection.
27).

(R. 126-

Trust filed its response to Development's objection (R. 142-

48) , and objected to Development's request for oral argument on its
objection.
C.

(R. 149-50).
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT.

The trial court overruled Development's objections to the
Order and Judgment (R. 152) , and executed it.

(R. 153-56)1.

A

copy of the trial court's Order and Judgment appears herein as
Exhibit "A" to the Addendum.
V.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

On or about June 23, 1989 Trust and Development entered
into a written contract for Trust to purchase from Development real
property in Summit County known as Lot 37, Bald Eagle Club. (R.l,
14) . As part of that contract, Trust and Development entered into
a Letter of Guarantee (R.5, 6, 50-51, 136-37) memorializing the

*Trust also filed its Motion for Review and Award of Attorney
Fees. (R. 123-25). Development did not object to the attorney's
fees sought by Trust. The trial court awarded Trust's attorneys'
fees as prayed (R. 152), and executed an Order and Supplemental
Judgment awarding Trust its attorneys' fees in the amount of
$5,351.96. (R. 157-60). Development does not appeal that Order
and Supplemental Judgment or the trial court's award of Trust's
attorneys' fees.
5

parties7 rights and obligations to each other.

(R. 2-3, 14).

copy of that Letter of Guarantee appears herein as Exhibit "B"
the Addendum.
As relevant to the issues involved in this appeal,
Letter of Guarantee provided:
4.
In addition, you [Trust] shall be
guaranteed herein the following at the end of
20 months from the date of closing:
1. The lot shall be deemed to be worth
10% above the original published price in
Exhibit A by virtue of the following:
a. Purchaser shall build or keep said
lot.
b. Seller shall have the obligation
and option to pay the difference between
Buyers sale price at that time and the 10%
increase price as indicated below, or,
c.
At the Seller's option, Seller
shall be obligated to purchase the lot for
said amount of the guarantee indicated below,
Original Price List Exhibit A for Lot #37 is
$535,000.00
Final Special Discount Price:

$442,200.00

Guaranteed Price at the end of 20 months:
$588,500.00
In order to guarantee that funds shall be
available to support the above guarantees,
Seller hereby agrees to deed into escrow with
High Country Title Company, the deeds to four
Bald Eagle Homesites free and clear of all
encumbrances to inure to the benefit of the
Buyers, the payment of said guarantees. These
homesites
shall
be
transferable
and
6

nonexlusive [sic] so that a minimum of four
homesites shall always remain in escrow
throughout the 20 month period.
(R. 5-6, 50-51, 136-37).
As required by the Letter of Guarantee, Development
placed four other Bald Eagle Club lots—11,12,18 and 19—in escrow
with High Country Title Company, Park City, Utah.

(R. 60-62).

A

copy of the Deposit in Escrow appears herein as Exhibit "C" to the
Addendum.

The Deposit in Escrow provided that those four lots

would remain in escrow for 36 months, or until the conclusion of
any pending litigation, to provide security for purchasers7 rights
under various guarantees executed by Development.
"C" to Addendum).

(R. 61, Exhibit

The Deposit in Escrow specifically designated

Trust as a beneficiary.

(R. 60, Exhibit "C" to Addendum).

Trust determined not to keep or build on Lot 37 and tried
to sell the lot.
notice

It received an offer of $400,000.00, and gave

to Development

on March

18, 1991 either

to pay the

difference ($188,500.00) or to repurchase the lot for $588,500.00.
(R. 53) . Those were the two options available to Development under
the Letter of Guarantee.

Development refused, claiming the offer

was inadequate, and that it accordingly would not repurchase the
lot for $588,500.00. Development insisted that Trust must sell Lot
37 for a more substantial price, use a real estate broker, pay the
brokers commission, and receive no interest on its funds until it
7

sold Lot 37.

Only then would Development agree to pay the

difference between the gross sales price received by Trust and
$588,500.00.

(R. 53).

Trust

contended

this was not the

intention

of the

parties, not its understanding, and not an accurate interpretation
of the Letter of Guarantee.

Trust and Development could not

resolve their differences concerning Developments

obligations

under the Letter of Guarantee. Consequently, Trust and Development
designated Gregory S. Bell, Esq. of Salt Lake City to arbitrate the
dispute.

(R. 2, 15). Mr. Bell (the "Arbitrator") conducted an

arbitration hearing where he took testimony and heard argument (the
"Hearing") on May 17, 1991. (R. 2, 15).
Before the arbitration, Trust and Development filed their
respective summaries of the dispute to be arbitrated.
56) .

(R. 53, 55-

In particular, the parties fully empowered the Arbitrator to

determine "(a) whether the offer submitted by [Trust] in the sum of
$400,000 was a bona fide offer establishing the fair market value
[of Lot 37] and, (b) who was to bear the costs of sale of the
property."

(R. 40) . Development argued throughout the arbitration

process that the $400,000.00 figure was too low.

Trust requested

"a decision instructing [Development] to either accept the sales
price and pay $188,500.00, plus reasonable interest to the date of

8

payment, or, in the alternative, to pay $588,500.00 and repurchase
the tendered lot."

(R. 53).

The Arbitrator issued his award on May 23, 1991.

(R.

99) . The American Arbitration Association ("AAA") mailed copies to
the parties that day.

(R. 98). In this award the Arbitrator (1)

determined the fair market value of Lot 37 to be $400,000.00; (2)
ordered Development to pay Trust $188,8002, plus interest at 10%
from

March

28,

1991

until

paid;

(3)

gave

Development

the

alternative until May 30, 1991 of purchasing Lot 37 for $588,8003
in cash; (4) required each party to pay customary closing costs if
Development elected the repurchase option; (5) determined that
Trust was not responsible for paying the real estate commission.
Development did not meet the Arbitrators May 30, 1991
deadline for repurchasing Lot 37. Development requested Trust to
give Development

a 45-day extension—until

purchase Lot 37 for $588,500.

July

15,

1991—to

(R. 104). As an inducement to Trust

to grant it this extension while forbearing from trying to collect
on the Award, Development agreed to pay Trust interest "at the rate

2

Seven days later the Arbitrator issued, and the AAA mailed,
(R. 100-01).
The Award was
his Amended Award (the "Award").
identical to the initial award except for the reduction of the
award amount from $188,800 to $188,500. A copy of the Award
appears herein as Exhibit "D" to the Addendum.
3

This amount was reduced by $300 to $588,500 in the Award.
This reduction is explained in footnote 2, supra.
9

of 2 points over Harris Bank of Chicago's prime rate," rather than
the 10% the Arbitrator awarded.

(R. 104). A copy of this May 29,

1991 extension appears herein as Exhibit "E" to the Addendum.
Development did not exercise its extension on or before
July 15, 1991.

Consequently, Trust began efforts to enforce the

Award. On July 16, 1991 Trust sent Development a Notice of Default
and Breach of Agreement (the "Notice").

(R. 64). Trust advised

Development in the Notice that Trust had requested High Country
Title, the escrow agent under Developments Deposit in Escrow (R.
60-62; Exhibit "C" to Addendum), to sell the four escrowed lots
(lots 11, 12, 18 and 19), and to pay Trust $188,500, plus awarded
interest, from the sale proceeds.

A copy of the Notice appears

herein as Exhibit "F" to the Addendum.
On October 10, 1991 Trust filed its Verified Petition for
Confirmation of Arbitration Award.

(R. 1-7). Development raised

no objection to the Award until November 21, 1991, when it filed
its Answer to the Petition.
VI.
A.

(R. 14-17).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Development has waived its right to challenge the

Award on any grounds.

It has not marshaled any evidence as

appellate rules require.

It has not presented any legal argument

on some issues.

It has raised an issue not included in its

docketing statement. This waiver and these failures to comply with
10

appellate rules justify summary affirmance of the trial court
without reaching the issues Development raises.
B.

Development filed with the trial court an affidavit

rife with hearsay, foundationless assertions, and unsubstantiated
opinions.

Trust timely objected to that affidavit.

The trial

court properly refused to consider the portions of that affidavit
to which Trust objected.

This Court should affirm the trial

court's Order and Judgment because the record utterly lacks any
competent evidence that Trust procured the Award through fraud.
C. A trial court can vacate an arbitration award only on
the grounds contained in applicable arbitration statutes. The Utah
Arbitration Act does not permit the judicial review of damages
requested by Development.
D. The Deposit in Escrow secured buyers such as Trust in
the

event

Development

defaulted

Development's various guarantees.

on

obligations

arising

from

In the Award the Arbitrator

ruled that, pursuant to the Letter of Guarantee, Development owed
Trust $188,500 plus interest. Trust's efforts to satisfy the Award
from the escrowed property is not an election of remedies, unless
judicial enforcement of the Award permits a double recovery.
Confirmation of the Award will not create a double recovery.
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VII.
A.

ARGUMENT

DEVELOPMENT WAIVED ITS RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE THE

AWARD; ITS ATTEMPTS ARE ABSOLUTELY BARRED.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(2) unambiguously provides: "A
motion to vacate an award shall be made to the court within 20 days
after a copy of the award is served upon the moving party. . . M
(emphasis added).

The Arbitrator served his Award on Development

on May 30, 1991. AAA Rule 45 (R. 102, p. 19) defines delivery as
occurring upon mailing.
motion

to

vacate

Accordingly, Development had to file any

the Award

not

later

than

June

19, 1991.

Development did not do so until more than five months after that
deadline.

(R. 14) .

Consequently, it is absolutely barred from

contesting Trust's Petition for Confirmation.
Trust argued to the trial court the untimeliness of
Development's

effort

to

contest

the Award.

(R.

24-28, 85).

Development does not claim on appeal that its effort to vacate the
Award was timely.4
When a party to an arbitration such as Development fails
to move to vacate an award within the time limit prescribed by the
statute, that party has waived its right to challenge the award.
4

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(2) does permit a motion to vacate
based on the procurement of an award by fraud within 20 days after
the grounds are known or should have been known.
The record
contains no indication that Development raised its purported fraud
arguments within 20 days after it discovered the claimed fraud.
12

See Robinson & Wells P.C. v. Warren,, 669 P.2d 844, 848 n.6 (Utah
1983) . The Idaho Supreme Court has explained the expansive nature
of such waiver:
Cases decided under the Uniform Arbitration
Act(51 make it clear that this statutory time
limitation is strictly construed and must be
complied with before a court can vacate any
award. This is true even if the party seeking
to vacate the award asserts a valid ground
under the act.
A court cannot exceed this [20-] day period.
Because the time limit under the act is
strictly construed, failure to comply with
that time limit raises an absolute bar to a
motion to vacate.
Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Electric Co. , 105 Idaho 36, 665
P.2d 1046, 1049 (1983)(citations omitted)(emphasis provided by the
court).
It makes no difference that Development did not file a
pleading specifically called a "motion to vacate:"
The pleading filed by appellant is denominated
an answer, but we think in legal effect it may
be regarded as a motion to vacate the award,
since it affirmatively sets out reasons why
such should be done and prays that the award
be vacated and that plaintiff take nothing.
Giannopulos v. Pappas. 80 Utah 442, 15 P.2d 353, 355 (1932).

5

Utah, along with 33 other states, and the District of
Columbia, has adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act. See 7 Uniform
Laws Annotated, Uniform Arbitration Act, 1955 Act, Table of
Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted (Supp. 1992), at p.l.
13

Similarly,

the

losing

party

to

an

arbitration

in

Chauffeurs, Teamsters. Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No,
135 v, Jefferson Trucking Co,, Inc., 628 F.2d 1023, 1027 (7th Cir.
1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1125 (1981), never filed a motion to
vacate the arbitrator's award within the time prescribed for such
motions.

Later, the successful

arbitration award.

party moved

to

enforce the

Only then did the losing party raise its

grounds to vacate the award, not affirmatively, but as "defenses.ft
The sole issue in Jefferson Trucking was whether the losing party
could raise, as defenses, objections that were untimely under the
section of the arbitration statute dealing with motions to vacate.
In holding that the losing party could not raise such untimely
objections as "defenses," the Seventh Circuit held:
Since the defendant failed to file such a
motion within the time period prescribed by
the statute, we hold the defendant is
therefore barred from prosecuting its claim to
invalidate the award.
The conclusion that the defendant is barred by
the statute of limitations from now seeking to
invalidate the award finds additional support
in the federal policy favoring voluntary
arbitration as the most expedient method of
resolving labor disputes. . . .
As the
district court observed, this policy would
seem to condemn the conduct of the defendant
who ignored an award disfavorable to it,
failed to move to vacate the award, and then
sought to be given its day in court when the
plaintiff brought suit in frustration to have
the arbitration award enforced.
If the
defendant's defenses were of such vital
14

importance to it, the defendant nevertheless
had an opportunity to raise them in the manner
contemplated by the statute.
* * *

Although the answer is not framed as a
counterclaim, the "defenses" raised therein
constitute a request for affirmative relief,
namely, vacation of the arbitration award. A
counterclaim for affirmative relief may not be
asserted if barred by the statute of
limitations.
(citations omitted).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-12 provides, in part: "the court
shall confirm the award unless a motion is timely filed to vacate
or modify the award."

(emphasis added). In this case, Development

did not file a timely motion to vacate or modify the award.

Its

attempt was over five months late.
By using the word "shall" the statute explicitly required
the trial court to enter an order confirming the Award. See, e.g. ,
Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App.
1989)(when

a statute uses the word

mandatory).

"shall," the

statute is

Because Development did not file a timely motion to

vacate or modify the Award, this Court should affirm the trial
courts order confirming the Award.
Even if, however, Development had timely raised any of
its objections to the Award, which it did not, none of these
objections has legal merit.
15

B.

THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE ARBITRATOR'S

AWARD WAS PROCURED THROUGH FRAUD.
At page 12 of its Brief, Development cavalierly asserts,
without reference to the record, that two affidavits purportedly
"created a material issue of fact as to whether [Trust] obtained
the arbitration award through fraud."

Development's assertion

fails for two reasons.
1.

Development Has Failed To Marshal Any Evidence.

Ordinarily, appellate courts concern themselves with the
marshaling doctrine when an appellant does not marshal facts
supporting the trial court's holding.

See, e.g., State v. Larsen,

828 P.2d 487, 490-91 (Utah App. 1992).

Marshaling requires an

appellant to act as a "devil's advocate." It requires an appellant
to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence" supporting the trial court's decision.

West

Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.
1991).

Development has failed to marshal the evidence supporting

the trial court's ruling. As a result this Court presumes that the
clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court's decision.
See, e.g. , State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah App.
1990).
Moreover, Development has not marshaled any evidence in
support

of

its

own

arguments.
16

Nowhere

in

its

Brief

does

Development refer to a single point in the record that supports
Development's factual assertions.

Utah Appellate courts have

repeatedly held they will not entertain appeals that lack adequate
references to the record:
"A reviewing court is entitled to have the
issues
clearly
defined
with
pertinent
authority cited and is not simply a depository
in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research." State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)(quoting
Williamson v. Qpsahl, 92 Ill.App.3d 1087,
1089, 48 111.Dec. 510, 511, 416 N.E.2d 783,
The marshaling requirement
784 (1981)).
provides the appellate court the basis from
which to conduct a meaningful review of facts
challenged on appeal. See Wright v. Westside
Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 (Utah App.
1990)(the
purpose
of
the
marshaling
requirement is to spare appellate courts the
onerous burden of combing through the record
in search of supporting factual matters.)
State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d at p.491.
2.

There is No Evidence in the Record to Support

Developments Claim of Fraud.
Even if Development had marshaled all relevant evidence,
there

is

no

competent

evidence

in

the

record

supporting

Development's claim of fraud.
Development's

own

authority

explicitly

holds

that

affidavits such as the January 30, 1992 affidavit of Marc Kaplan
(the "Kaplan Affidavit") are inadmissible:
To raise a genuine issue of fact, an affidavit
must do more than reflect the affiant's
17

opinions and conclusions . . . The mere
assertion that an issue of fact exists without
a proper evidentiary foundation to support
that assertion is insufficient to preclude the
granting of a summary judgment motion.
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983).
Development

repeatedly

contends

the

trial

court

overlooked "evidence" of fraud. Development fails to identify what
"evidence" the trial court overlooked.
"evidence."

In fact there was no such

The Kaplan Affidavit was rife with hearsay and

unsupported conclusions. Utah appellate courts have long directed
trial courts to ignore hearsay, opinions and factual statements
lacking proper foundation when a party makes timely objections to
objectionable portions of an affidavit.

See, e.g.. Salt Lake City

Corp. v. James Constructors Inc.. 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988) .
After Development

filed the Kaplan Affidavit, Trust

timely objected and requested the trial court to refuse to consider
specified paragraphs of the Kaplan affidavit on grounds they were
conclusory, lacked foundation, contained only his opinions and
belief, were not admissible in evidence, and were insufficient as
a matter of law to create an issue of material fact.
Trust

supported

authority:

its

objections

with

citations

(R. 83-84).
to

relevant

Treloaaan v. Treloqqan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985);

Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985); Walker v. Rockv

18

Mountain Recreation Corp, . 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538, 542
(1973).

(R. 83).
Based

on Trust's timely objections the trial court

disregarded, as it should have, the objectionable portions of the
Kaplan Affidavit.
App. 1989).

Cf^, Hardv v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 925 (Utah

The trial court did not err in refusing to

consider

Development's conclusory, foundationless opinions and hearsay.
There was no evidence of fraud before the trial court.
In addition, a court can vacate an arbitration award only
if "the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means;. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(1)(a).
Development's pleadings nowhere prove or even suggest
that Trust procured the Award through fraud.
Dispute

(R.

53)

states

it

had

Development's Summary of Dispute

received

Trust's Summary of
a

$400,000

offer.

(R. 55) gave the reasons it

believed this $400,000 offer was not bona fide.

Development

admitted that the parties had fully empowered the arbitrator to
determine "whether the offer submitted by [Trust] in the sum of
$400,000 was a bona fide offer establishing the fair market value"
of Lot 37. (R. 40).
Development also admitted that at least since March of
1991, Trust had listed Lot 37 for sale for $588,500.
Additionally,

during

the Hearing
19

Development

(R. 40).

introduced

into

evidence an exhibit showing the listed prices for Bald Eagle lots
as of April 15, 1991.
is the highest
development.

(R. 106). Trust's listing price for Lot 37

price

shown

for

any

lot

in the

Bald

Eagle

Another lot, Lot 11, is the same size as Lot 37, but

was listed for only $435,000.

(R. 106).

The evidence at the

Hearing therefore indicated that Trust was in fact attempting to
maximize

its

recovery

and

minimize

Development's

financial

obligation to Trust.
All this evidence was before the Arbitrator and the trial
court. Based upon that evidence, the Arbitrator determined, within
the scope of his authority, that the $400,000 offer received by
Trust was a bona fide offer as of the date of the Hearing.
Development has not raised a single admissible material fact
demonstrating that the finding by the arbitrator was "procured by
corruption, fraud or other undue means" as required by § 78-31a14(1)(a).
Section

78-31a-14(l)

permits

a

court

to

vacate

an

arbitration award only if certain actions occurred at the time of
the arbitration.

Development does not claim, and in good faith

cannot claim, that any of the after-occurring events it relies on
had any effect on the arbitration process itself, even if the
record did contain any competent evidence of the facts asserted by

20

Development.

As Trust showed above, the record lacks any such

evidence.
3.

Development Waived a Hearing.

Finally, Development complains that the trial court's
refusal to grant a hearing provides some basis for reversal. Trust
filed its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings on January 16, 1992. (R. 22).

Development filed its

memorandum opposing that motion on February 4, 1992.

(R. 36).

Neither party requested oral argument at the time it filed its
principal memorandum. Trust filed its reply memorandum on February
10, 1992 (R. 80), with its counsel's affidavit of attorney fees.
(R. 107). Trust also filed, on February 10, 1992, its Notice to
Submit Motion for Decision (R. 120). On February 12, 1992, after
the parties had filed all permitted pleadings, and Trust had filed
its notice to submit, Development for the first time requested oral
argument.

(R. 115). On February 14, 1992 Development filed its

objection to that request. (R. 117). Based on Trust's objection
the trial court denied Development's untimely request.
Rule 4-501(3)(f), Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
provides:
If no written request for a hearing was made
at the time the parties filed their principal
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be
deemed waived. (emphasis added).

21

Development's argument regarding "fraud" lacks merit.
This Court should affirm the trial court.6
C.

THE TRIAL COURT LACKED THE AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER

TRUST'S DAMAGES.
1.

This Court Should Not Consider This Issue Due to

Trust's Failure to Comply With Appellate Rules.
Development now claims the trial court erred in not
taking evidence de novo concerning Trust's damages.

Development

did not raise this issue in its docketing statement.

Except

perhaps inferentially, Development did not raise this point before
the trial court.

Moreover, Development's third issue fails to

comply with Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9) , which requires an argument to
contain "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on." Development's two-paragraph discussion of this
issue ignores this requirement.

6

In its summary of its argument for its Point I, Development
apparently claims the trial court failed to allow Development "a
reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery." Although Development
did not develop this assertion in the Argument section of its
brief, Trust does want to address it briefly. Development never
requested any additional time to conduct discovery. Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(f) provides the mechanism for requesting additional time for
discovery. That rule, however, is not self-executing. A party
seeking to avail itself of the Rule's benefits must affirmatively
set forth the reasons why it needs additional time. See generally,
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 840-42 (Utah App.
1987).
Development never invoked Rule 56(f) or requested an
extension. It accordingly was entitled to none.
22

When an appellate brief fails to provide any legal
analysis

or

citation

to

legal

authority

setting

forth

the

applicable legal principles in support of an appellant's contention
that summary judgment was improperly entered against it, the Utah
Supreme Court declines to rule on that issue, and affirms the trial
court.
1074,

See, e.g., Graco Fishing v. Ironwood Exploration. 766 P.2d
1079 (Utah 1988).

Similarly, this Court "has routinely

declined to consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on
appeal."

State v. Yates. 189 U.A.R. 7, 9 (App. 1992).

In such

cases, this Court disregards the issue and affirms the order being
appealed. See, e.g.. Johnson-Bowles v. Division of Securities. 829
P.2d 101, 117 (Utah App. 1992).
2.

This Court and the Trial Court Are Without Power or

Authority to Review the Merits of the Award. Including Its Award of
Damages.
The Utah Arbitration Act provide a method by which an
arbitration award "may be given legal sanction and reduced to
judgment by summary proceedings in the nature of a motion filed in
court."

Giannopulos v. Pappas. 80 Utah 442, 15 P.2d 353, 356

(1932)(emphasis added).

Utah law favors arbitration as a speedy

and inexpensive method of adjudicating disputes.

To serve that

policy, judicial review of arbitration awards is strictly limited
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to statutory grounds and procedures. See Robinson & Wells, P.C. v.
Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983).
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(1), a court can vacate
an arbitration award only on the following grounds:
(a)
the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or other undue means;
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral,
showed partiality, or an arbitrator was guilty
of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of
any party;
(c)

the arbitrators exceeded their powers;

(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the
hearing upon sufficient cause shown, refused
to hear evidence material to the controversy,
or otherwise conducted the hearing to the
substantial prejudice of the rights of a
party; or
(e)
there was no arbitration agreement
between the parties to the arbitration
proceeding.
A court is powerless to vacate an arbitration award on any other
grounds.

See Robinson & Wells, 669 P.2d at p. 847. None of these

grounds permits judicial review of the merits of an arbitration
award.

This prohibition against judicial review of the merits of

arbitration

awards

is rooted

in the fundamental

purposes of

arbitration.
Parties

employing

arbitration

arbitrator's award is final and binding.

have

agreed

that

an

They have bargained for

the decision of an arbitrator not a court.

See, e.g.,

Morrison-

Knudsen Co,. Inc. v. Makahuena Corp., 66 Hawaii 663, 675 P.2d 760,
766 (1983); Board of Educ. Posen-Robbins School Dist. v. Daniels.
108 Ill.App.3d 550, 64 111.Dec. 98, 439 N.E.2d 27, 30 (App. 1982);
AFSCME Council 65. Local Union No. 667 v. Aitkin County. 357 N.W.2d
432, 436 (Minn. App. 1984); Ridley School Dist. v. Ridley Educ.
Ass'n.. 84 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 117, 479 A.2d 641, 643 (1984).
The California Supreme Court recently explained the
reason why arbitration awards are final and binding:
The arbitrator's decision should be the end,
not the beginning, of the dispute.
Ensuring arbitral finality thus requires that
judicial intervention in the arbitration
process be minimized. Because the decision to
arbitrate grievances evinces the parties'
intent to bypass the judicial system and thus
avoid potential delays at the trial and
appellate levels, arbitral finality is a core
component of the parties' agreement to submit
to arbitration. Thus, an arbitration decision
is final and conclusive because the parties
have agreed that it be so. By ensuring that an
arbitrator's decision is final and binding,
courts simply assure that the parties receive
the benefit of their bargain.
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase. 3 Cal.4th 1, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 832
P.2d 899, 903 (1992)(citations omitted) (emphasis in opinion).
Arbitration is not a mere prelude to litigation.

See.

City of Fairbanks Mun. Util. System v. Lees. 705 P.2d 457, 460
(Alas.

1985).

The

Kansas

Supreme

Court

has

explained

why

arbitration would be a futile, meaningless exercise if courts took
it upon themselves to review the merits of an arbitration award:

The reason an arbitration award will not be
considered de novo by a court is if it were
otherwise, arbitration would only then be a
dress rehearsal for litigation rather than an
alternative to litigation. As noted recently
by the Vermont supreme Court in R.E. Bean
Constr. Co* v. Middleburv Assoc. , 139 Vt. 200,
428 A.2d 306:
"The
courts
must
respect
an
arbitrator's
determinations;
otherwise, those determinations will
merely add another expensive and
time consuming layer to the already
complex litigation process."
139
Vt. at 204-05, 428 A.2d 306.
Foley Co. v. Grindsted Prods., Inc., 233 Kan. 339, 662 P.2d 1254,
1262-63 (1983).
Almost
consequences

50 years ago, Judge Learned
of

arbitration

for

parties

Hand
who

identified
have

agreed

the
to

arbitrate their dispute:
Arbitration may or may not be a desirable
substitute for trials in courts; as to that
the parties must decide in each instance. But
when they have adopted it, they must be
content with its informalities; they may not
hedge
it
about
with
those
procedural
limitations which it is precisely its purpose
to avoid. They must content themselves with
looser approximations to the enforcement of
their rights than those that the law accords
them, when they resort to its machinery.
American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144
F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944).
Because arbitration is final and binding, reviewing courts in
states such as Utah that have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act
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are prohibited from considering the merits of arbitration awards, 7
See e.g. , Lees. 705. P.2d at p. 460 (Alaska); Arizona Public Serv.
Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 149 Ariz. 239, 717 P.2d
918, 922-23 (App. 1985); Foust v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 786 P.2d
450, 451 (Colo. App. 1989); Harris v. Haught. 435 So.2d 926, 928
(Fla. App. 1983); Jackson Trak Group v. Mid States Port Auth. . 242
Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122, 127 (1988); Taunton Mun. Light Plant Comm'n
v. Geiringer & Assoc, 560 F.Supp. 1249, 1252 (D. 1983), aff 'd. .
775 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1983) (applying Massachusetts codification of
Uniform Arbitration Act); Byron Center Public Schools v. Kent
County Educ. Ass'n.. 186 Mich. App. 29, 463 N.W.2d 112, 113 (App.
1990); Beebout v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 271,
273 (Minn. App. 1985); Holman v. Trans World Airlines, 737 F.Supp.
527, 530 (E.D. Mo. 1989)(applying Missouri codification of Uniform
Arbitration Act); Glasgow Education Ass'n. v. Board of Trustees.
Valley County. 242 Mont. 478, 791 P.2d 1367, 1371 (1990); Turner v.
Nicholson Properties. Inc.. 80 N.C. App. 208, 341 S.E.2d 42, 45
(App.) disc, review denied. 317 N.C. 714, 347 S.E.2d 457 (1986);
Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical

7

School v. Greater

The Uniform Arbitration Act is national in character and § 7831a-14 is uniform with § 12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act.
Accordingly, this Court relies on case law from other Uniform
Arbitration Act jurisdictions to interpret the meaning and effect
of § 78-31a-14. Cf. , Power Systems & Controls. Inc. v. Keiths
Elect. Const. Co.. 765 P.2d 5, 10 n.2 (Utah App. 1988)
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Johnstown Vocational-Technical Educ. Ass'n., 88 Pa. Commonwealth
Ct. 141, 489 A.2d 945, 948 n.4 (1985).
As part of this prohibition against reviewing the merits of
arbitration awards, courts cannot review an arbitrator7s award of
damages under the Uniform Arbitration Act:
If the arbitrators in assessing damages commit
an error of law or fact, but do not overstep
the limits of the issues submitted to them, a
court may not substitute its judgment on the
matter.
City of Lawrence v. Falzarano, 380 Mass. 18, 402 N.E.2d 1017, 1024
(1980).

See also. Foley Co. v. Grindsted Products Inc., 233 Kan.

339, 662 P.2d 1254, 1261-62 (1983)(interpreting Kansas and Maryland
codifications of Uniform Arbitration Act); Seither & Cherry Co. v.
Illinois Bank Bldq. Corp., 95 Ill.App.3d 191, 50 111.Dec. 672, 419
N.E.2d 940, 945 (App. 1981).
3.

Neither This Court Nor the Trial Court Can Consider

Evidence Not Before the Arbitrator.
Development seeks to vacate the Award based on new evidence
not presented to the Arbitrator at the arbitration Hearing.
jurisdictions

such

as

Utah

that

have

adopted

the

In

Uniform

Arbitration Act, courts refuse to vacate arbitration awards based
on claims of new evidence. See, Flight Systems v. Paul A. Laurence
Co. . 715

F.Supp.

1125,

1129

(D.D.C.

1989)(applying

codification of Uniform Arbitration Act).
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Virginia

Cf., Shearson Hayden

Stone, Inc. v. Liana, 653 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1981)(applying
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.); Central Gen.
Hospital v. Hanover Ins. Co.. 49 N.Y.2d 950, 428 N.Y.S.2d 881, 406
N.E.2d 739, 740 (1980)(applying New York (non-Uniform) statutes).
In short, when parties have agreed, as here, to arbitrate a dispute
they "are bound bv the arbitration award made upon the testimony
before the arbitrator." Bridgeport Rolling Mills Co. v. Brown, 314
F.2d 885, 886 (2d Cir.), cert, denied. 375 U.S. 821 (1963) (emphasis
added).
Brown is a short, but illuminating decision.

The employer

fired Brown because it suspected him of stealing materials.

The

arbitrator found the testimony against Brown to be "mere rumor and
gossip," and ordered Brown reinstated.

Id. at p. 885. After the

arbitration award the employer sought to vacate the award based on
new

evidence that Brown perjured

himself

at the arbitration

hearing. The employer claimed this resulted in a fraudulent award.
Rejecting the employer's arguments the court held:
That the employer at the time his motion was
presented to the district court may have had,
or may now have, sufficient evidence to
justify a discharge of Brown for cause if he
were now in the employer's employ is
irrelevant to the issues the arbitrator heard
and has no bearing upon the arbitrator's
determination that the employer did not have
just cause to discharge him in 1961. Brown's
guilt, if now proved, does not require the
conclusion that the arbitrator's award, when
made, was procured by fraud, for the decision

of the arbitrator was based upon the failure
of the employer's proof to convince rather
than on the strength of Brown's alleged
perjurious testimony.
Id. at pp. 885-86.

Accordingly, the Brown court affirmed the

trial court's refusal to consider the employer's new evidence.
In American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales
Co., 144 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1944), the parties had agreed to submit
to arbitration a dispute concerning the damages a buyer of nuts
suffered as a result of the seller's nondelivery.

The arbitrator

awarded the buyer specified damages, and the buyer petitioned the
district court to confirm that award.

The seller moved to vacate

the award on the grounds there was no evidence regarding damages
before the arbitrator other than a single statement in the brief of
buyer's attorney.

The district court denied seller's motion to

vacate, and entered judgment on the award, holding that the mere
claim for damages in the attorney's brief was adequate basis for
the arbitrator's award of damages.

Id. at p. 449.

In affirming

the trial court, Judge Learned Hand wrote:
Had the parties at bar submitted evidence upon
the issue of damages, and the arbitrators
looked
elsewhere,
it might
have
been
"misbehavior"; but it was not "misbehavior" to
settle a controversy meant to be finally
disposed of, by the only means open to the
arbitrators, as the case stood.
Id. at p. 451.
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Appellate courts, including the trial court, which essentially
served in an appellate role in this case, cannot review evidence
that was not introduced at the arbitration hearing. The cases make
this clear.

The trial court and this Court can consider only

evidence presented to the arbitrator.
This prohibition against considering new evidence, moreover,
is not unique to the review of arbitration awards:
For the purpose of determining whether a
verdict is or is not excessive, an appellate
court will consider only the same evidence as
was considered by the jury, but will not
consider after trial facts presented to the
appellate court by motion. Affidavits filled
[sic] or obtained after the trial in the court
below was completed may not be considered by
the appellate court as part of the evidence in
the case.
5. Am.Jur.2d APPEAL AND ERROR, § 736.

See also, 5 C.J.S., APPEAL

& ERROR § 1487 (matters occurring after ruling objected to will not
be considered).
The trial court would have committed

legal error

if it

considered after-occurring evidence not before the Arbitrator.
Development does not dispute that the value of Lot 37 was the
central issue decided by the Arbitrator.

Even if the evidence at

the Hearing was wholly lacking, or if Development may now have new
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evidence/ this Court should affirm the trial court's Order and
8

As Trust has shown above, Development's arguments regarding
new evidence are legally ineffective. They also are factually
unsupported and do not indicate any "windfall" or injustice at all.
As Trust argued to the trial court:
[Development's] statement at p. 5 of its Objection [to
the trial court's Order and Judgment] that the $400,000
price "has never been established to have been a good
faith offer consistent to the fair market value of the
property" is simply wrong.
[Development] argued
throughout the arbitration that the $400,000 figure was
too low. The Arbitrator considered all the documents
[Development] now parades before this Court.
After
considering [Development's] argument and these same
documents, the Arbitrator specifically found the fair
market value of the property was $400,000. The Court has
now confirmed the Award containing that finding.
As a result, [Development's] "windfall" argument is
irrelevant. It is also inaccurate and misguided in the
following respects:
(1) it states—contrary to the
record, and without any basis—that [Trust] received
$570,000 for Lot 37; (2) it ignores all closing costs
[Trust] incurred in a $570,000 sale;. . . (3) it ignores
the fact that [Trust] has been paying property taxes on
Lot 37 since June 23, 1989; and (4) it ignores the fact
that [Trust] has either been paying interest on, or has
lost the opportunity to invest, $442,200 since June 23,
1989.
[Development's] argument does nothing more than encourage
the Court to speculate. The court could just as easily
speculate that if all of [Trust's] costs were considered,
[Trust] has lost money. There is no reason for the Court
to speculate at all, however. The Arbitrator heard all
the evidence now urged by [Development] on this Court,
and issued his Award ordering [Development] to pay
[Trust] $188,500.
The Award conclusively fixed
[Development's] debt to [Trust] at $188,500. The Court
confirmed that Award when it granted [Trust's] Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings.
[Development's] Objection is its last desperate attempt
32

Judgment confirming the Award.

to avoid the conclusive liability imposed almost a year
ago by the Arbitrator on [Development]. The Objection is
without any foundation in law, in reality, or in the
record. It is contrary to the unambiguous language of
the Arbitrator's Award.
It is nothing more than a
transparent and futile effort by [Development] to
litigate this entire matter for the third time.
(R. 145-46).
In addition, many things changed in the intervening ten
months, including a dramatic reduction in interest rates.
When interest rates fall, land prices typically rise.
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D.

THE ELECTION OF REMEDIES DOCTRINE HAS NOTHING TO DO

WITH THIS CASE.
Development admits, as it must, that the purpose of the
election of remedies doctrine is to prevent double recovery•

This

Court has recognized this rule:
The doctrine of election of remedies is a
technical rule of procedure and its purpose is
not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to
prevent double redress for a single wrong.
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671
P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983)(quoting, Roval
Resources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp.,
603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979)).
Robert Lanaston, Ltd. v. McOuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 556 n.2 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (1987).
The Utah Supreme Court explained the operation of the election
of remedies doctrine:
The doctrine of election of remedies applies
as a bar only where the two actions are
inconsistent,
generally
based
upon
incompatible facts; the doctrine does not
operate as an estoppel where the two or more
remedies are given to redress the same wrong
and are consistent.
Where the remedies
afforded are inconsistent, it is the election
of one that bars the other; but where they are
consistent, it is the satisfaction that
operates as a bar.
Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 4 Utah
2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045, 1049 (1955). When remedies are consistent,
a party may permissibly pursue them singly or together until it has
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one satisfaction. See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d
399, 401 (1964).
This matter, however, does not involve a double recovery. It
does not involve inconsistent remedies. Rather, it merely involves
a judgment creditor's efforts to collect on an arbitration award.
In this context, M[t]he doctrine of election of remedies does not
apply to the successive steps taken by a judgment creditor to
enforce his judgment."
1065.

28 C.J.S., ELECTION OF REMEDIES, § 3 at p.

See also, Trahan v. Trahan, 455 A.2d 1307, 1312 (R.I.

1983)(judgment

creditor

can

pursue

distinct

remedies

simultaneously); Lipton v. Lipton, 211 Ga. 442, 86 S.E.2d 299, 302
(1955)(judgment creditor may concurrently pursue all available
remedies to obtain satisfaction of judgment and neither can be
pleaded in abatement of the other until judgment creditor receives
full satisfaction.)
Development requested, and received from Trust, an additional
4 5 days after the date of the Award to repurchase Lot 37 for
$588,500.

Development did not take advantage of that extension.

When Developments extension to repurchase Lot 37 for $588,500
expired, Trust was entitled, pursuant to the Award, to retain Lot
37, and to commence efforts to collect "$188,500 plus interest at
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10% from March 28, 1991 until paid."9 (Award, R. 101; Exhibit "D"
to Addendum).
Consequently, Trust advised Development on July 16, 1991 that
Trust had requested the escrow agent to liquidate the escrowed lots
held for security so Trust could recover the $188,500 awarded it by
the Arbitrator.

(R. 64; Exhibit "F" to Addendum). Development can

point to nothing in the record showing Trust ever received any
proceeds pursuant to that request to the escrow agent.
When that effort to collect on the Award failed, Trust filed
its Petition, still seeking to recover the same $188,500 awarded it

9

The Award did not give Development its choice between paying
Trust $188,500 and repurchasing Lot 37 for $588,500. Rather, it
ordered Development to pay Trust $188,500, but, in a proviso, gave
Development seven days from the initial award within which to
repurchase Lot 37 in lieu of making the ordered payment:
Respondent, Marc Development, a corporation, is ordered
to pay to Claimant, Arthur Mintz, Trustee of the Mintz
Family Trust, $188,500 plus interest at 10% from March
28, 1991 until paid.
Provided, however, in lieu of
paying the foregoing award to Claimant, Respondent shall
have the option of repurchasing Unit 37 of The Bald Eagle
Club at Deer Valley from Claimant, on or before May 30,
1991 for $588,500.00
in cash, the burden of giving
notice to Claimant of such election and arranging for
closing being on Respondent. (R.101; Exhibit M D" to
Addendum)
The Award could not have been clearer that it was an award of
damages against Development, and that whether Development bought
Lot 37 for $588,500, or paid Trust $188,500, Development was
required by the Award to reimburse Trust in cash for the difference
between the guaranteed price of Lot 37 ($588,500) and its fair
market value on March 23, 1991 ($400,000).
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by the Arbitrator. The trial court's confirmation of the Award did
not permit Trust a double recovery.

To the contrary, it only

permitted Trust to treat the Award as a judgment, and to begin
execution on the Award it received over a year ago, but on which it
has yet to recover.
At page 14 of its brief, Development makes the puzzling
assertion that Trust's request to the escrow agent had the effect
"of forcing [Development] to repurchase the lot [37] rather than
accept the monetary award of the arbitrator.

As a consequence,

[Trust] has waived the monetary portion of the arbitration award
and, therefore, the award is null and void.

. .'•

However,

Development cites no authority or rationale for this assertion.
The building lot that was subject to the parties' agreement
was Lot 37.

(R. 50). The lots deposited into escrow, however,

were lots 11, 12, 18 and 19.
escrow

agent

to

liquidate

(R. 60). When Trust requested the
the

assets

securing

Development's

performance, it requested a liquidation of Lots 11, 12, 18 and 19.
Trust requested the liquidation so it could recover the monetary
Award made by the Arbitrator. This action did not amount to waiver
of the monetary portion of the Award.

To the contrary, Trust

stated in its July 16, 1991 letter (R. 64) that Development had
forfeited any rights under the Award or the extension to reacquire
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Lot 37. Trust accordingly sought to recover the monetary amount of
the Award through sale of the escrowed security.
In addition, Development escrowed lots 11, 12, 18 and 19 "to
secure the guaranty" of Development.

Part of that guaranty was

Development's promise to pay Trust the difference between $588,500
and the fair market value of Lot 37 as of March 23, 1991.
60; Exhibits "B", "C" to Addendum).

(R. 5,

Lots 11, 12, 18 and 19

therefore served as security for Development's debt to Trust. The
Award merely liquidated the amount of the indebtedness Development
assumed in its Letter of Guarantee, and ordered Development to
honor the indebtedness it assumed in its Letter of Guarantee.

(R.

5-6, Exhibit "B" to Addendum). The Utah one-action rule, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-37-1, consequently

required

against Lots 11, 12, 18 and 19.

Trust to proceed

first

This requirement of § 78-37-1

presents yet another reason why Development's interpretation of the
election of remedies doctrine is incorrect.
Finally, as Trust has shown in the immediately preceding
subpart of its Argument, a court can vacate an arbitration award
only on statutory grounds.
grounds.

A court cannot vacate on any other

Development asks the Court to vacate the Award based on

events happening after the Hearing was over and the Award issued.
Development makes no claim the arbitration procedure itself was
flawed

with

respect

to

its

election
38

of

remedies

argument.

Development nowhere cites any statutory authority for this election
of remedies argument, and none exists.
The doctrine of election of remedies does not apply under
these circumstances.

It consequently provides no basis for

reversal of the trial court.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Appellee respectfully urges this Court to AFFIRM the trial
court's Order and Judgment.
DATED September 3D

1992.
Respectfully submitted,
ANDERSON & WATKINS
Glen D. Watkins
Bruce Wycoff

> \/J O
K*)****^

Attorneys for Appellee
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I hereby certify that I hand-delivered four copies of the
above and foregoing Appellee's Brief to Mr. Thomas T. Billings and
Mr. Jon E. Waddoups, VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 50 Sputh
Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 this .ffi^dav
of September, 1992.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ARTHUR MINTZ, Trustee of the
Mintz Family Trust,

;
;\

Case No. 920571-CA

Petitioner-Appellee,

vs.

i

Priority 16

MARC DEVELOPMENT, an
Illinois corporation,
Respondent-Appellant.
ADDENDUM

A.

March 25, 1992 Order and Judgment

B.

June 23, 1989 Letter of Guarantee

C.

July 1989 Deposit in Escrow

D.

May 30, 1991 Amended Award of Arbitrator

E.

May 29, 1991 Extension Agreement

F.

July 16, 1991 Notice of Default

NO.

FILED

ANDERSON & WATKINS
Glen D. Watkins, Esq. (#3397)
Bruce Wycoff, Esq. (#4448)
700 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Petitioner

MAR 2 5 1992

icft

Clerk of Summit County

BY

* W / V ^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR MINTZ# Trustee of the
Mintz Family Trust,

I

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

I

Case No. 11174

Petitioner/
vs.

MARC DEVELOPMENT/ a corporation/ I

Judge Homer Wilkinson

Respondent.

The Petitioner having filed its Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings on January 16, 1992; the Respondent having filed its
Memorandum in Opposition; Petitioner having filed its Reply Brief;
the Court having considered the moving papers, being fully advised
therein, having issued its Memorandum Decision dated February 19,
1992,

and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.
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Petitioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is

granted.

000153

BQ0K,;,;\;PAK413

2.

The May 30, 1991 Arbitration Award, which is the subject

of the Petition herein, is confirmed.
3.

Judgment is entered in favor of Petitioner and against

Respondent in the principal amount of $188,500, together with
Interest from March 28, 1991 through February 24,
1992 in the amount of $17,197.40;
Interest at the rate of $51.64 per day from
February 25, 1992, until the date of entry of this
Order and Judgment; and
Interest from and after the entry of this Order and
Judgment at the rate of 12% per annum, until paid.
4.

Attorneys' fees as allowed by arbitration statutes are

awarded subject to objection by the Respondent and review of the
Court.
JUDGMENT RENDERED this > **» day of *h\ <*~-e^<L~, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Homer F. Wilkinson
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 24th day of February, 1992, I hereby caused to be
telecopied, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing ORDER AND
JUDGMENT, to the following:
Thomas T. Billings, Esq.
(801) 534-0058
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Respondent
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CLERK'S MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, via the U.S. mail,
on the

1^

day of

VYVan,

, 1992, addressed to the

following:
Thomas T. Billings, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Respondent
Glen D. Watkins
ANDERSON & WATKINS
700 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Attorneys for Petitioner

Ofry &

GU/^vjL,fl^-fr.foJe,

(K:MIN91089\0224O4J.35A)
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To:

From:

Letter of Guarantee
*\\JTu FA«*i Ifair on> >-W*
Arthur M. Mintz-tSu^rc^
50 Foxhill
Woodside, California 84062
Mark
Hare
Bald
Park

Kaplan
Development
Eagle Club
City, Utah 84060

In reference to our recent discussion regarding the Bald Eagle
Club and your Homesite choice of t J i 2
» Mark Kaplan and
Marc Development hereby agree to the following:
1.
You shall receive an 8% discount from the published
price for you Homesite as Indicated in the attached Exhibit A*
2.
You shall receive an additional discount from said
price noted above in the amount of $50,000.
3.
If at any time during the 20 months from the date of
c l o s i n g , any price reduction from the original price l i s t that i s
offered t o any other lot purchaser, the same price reduction
s h a l l be granted to you,
4.
In addition, you shall be guaranteed herein the
following at the end of 20 months from the date of closing:
1.
The lot shall be deemed to be worth 10% above the
o r i g i n a l published price in Exhibit A by virtue of the following:
a.

Purchaser shall build or keep said l o t .

b.
Seller shall have the obligation and option
t o pay the difference between Buyer's sale price at that time and
the 10% increase price as indicated below, or,
c.
at the S e l l e r ' s option, S e l l e r shall be
obligated t o purchase the l o t for said amount of the guarantee
indicated below,

*n

Original Price List Exhibit A for Lot * 3 1
Final Special Discount Price: $ */V7.%ZOO
Guaranteed Price at the end of 20 months: S

000005

^3^:too

is $
.

In order to guarantee that funds shall be available to support
the above guarantees, Seller hereby agrees to deed Into escrow
with High Country Title Company, the deeds to four Bald Eagle
Homesites free and clear of all encumbrances to inure to the
benefit of the Buyers, the payment of said guarantees. These
homesites shall be transferable and nonexlusive so that a minimum
of four homesites shall always remain in escrow throughout the 20

month period.
Entered into this

1Z**

day of

NJU.^*_

Marc Development, Seller

PresiaVent
Arthur Mints , { ^ T » •,

r7Encr Cm

7-I'M

V k ^ .

7itMSrtx.
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1989.

DEPOSIT IN E 8 O 0 W

The undersigned Hare Developments inc., Ian Illinois
Corporation (Depositor)! does hereby deposit intd escrow with
High Country Title Company, a Utah Corporation and a title
agency, of Park City, Utah (Truetee), fee title. Ifree and clear
of encumbrances, to Units ll,_jy2, 1 8 , end^ 19. inclusive, of the
Bald Eagle Club at Deer valley, V"0feh "Expendable] Condominium
Project, (The Condominium Project) at recorded ixi the Office of
the County Recorder of Summit County, State of Utjah,
jok J30
J[
on Amount 3. 1989 ae Entry No. 311266 , in Book
Survey Map
beginning at Page 20S ,'and pursuant to Recor
(The Trust
?lli6*_
recorded on ^SHilJlJiS?. ** E n t r y N o '
Property). The terns and conditions or the Tru$ ere as

ti

trust!

follows:

i.
The Trust Property la deposited tobsecure the
guaranty of Depositor with regard to no more than] ten units
couUlneO in the Condominium Project. At the undent the
guaranty applies to Units to be purchased by the >ereona
indicated below;

1.

a.
9»
a.

9.
6.
7.

Unit
Unit
Unit
Unit
Unit
Unit
Unit

The foregoing
beneficiaries. A copy
each of the individual
incorporated herein ae

37
39
5
36
2»
20
34

Arthur Hunts, Trusts*
Cherle» Gibson
Nail and Jane Parry
Jam** and Susan 8wests
Huseell and Dawn N&lpon
Tom and Otey Oust
John J. and CuriMty *;. Mack
ltuigu'9. M i l l

individuals ere indicated fts
of the Guaranty between Depositor and
beneficiaries 16 attached pereto and
infoxmatlvn and direction to the Trustee.

2.

Depositor shall hav« a Right of Subetitutio n with
in its
sole discretion, should determine that it desltesf release from
the Trust of one ur more of the Units constituting the) Trust
Property, Depositior may receive luch release immediately upon
the deposit by Depositor in Trust under the terms and
conditions of vhis Deposit in Escrow of another uhit in the
Condominium Project, free and d e a r of encumbrances. At all
regard to the Trust Property sueh that if Depositor

• in «h« vtXI«a of tha SunaU County Rtcordat and raeord«d aufcuat 3, 1989 AM
Entry No. 149483 In Book 210 at Fits 3S» and tb* Racord ofTsurvay Map recorded
August 3, 1989 «t entry No. U9A82 In Book 210 »e »**• 35o)of ths official
r«c«rd* in the office of tbe Wasatch County Racgrdar.

0090C0

EXHIBIT

C

times .during the terms of this Trust* fouc units |in the
Condominium Project, free and d e a r of encumbrance*, shall
remain in the escrow.
3.
The term of this Escrow oorwnences <si the dote
hereof and shall exist for a period of thirty «iJ <3&) months
unless earlier terminated by agreement signed bybepo&UuL and
the beneficiaries hereof. The benefficierlea agrJe that they
will sign an agreement terminating the Escrow etjany time thai
there remains no longer at issue any of the obligations under
th» individual Letters of Guaranty applicable tolthe particular
beneficiary. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the {Escrow shall
continue during any periods that the Trust Propenty in the
Escrow is under litigation, until sueh litigation la complete
and nonappealable.
4.
The Trustee shall respond to the ddaw-dovn by a
particular beuefloiaiy wilh regard to the Ttust Ikoperty if the
beneficiary sends to the Trustee during the tern bf the Escrow,
a written Affidavit that U ) Depositor became obligated under
the terms and condition! of beneficiary's Letter pf Guaranty to
pay sums to beneficiary, (2) Beneficiary made denland upon
Depositor for the payment of such sums pursuant tto the tetter
of GWtauiy, <3) Tulity days have elapsed from U s demand upon
Depositor and Depositor has failed to pay the s u m owed
beneficiary under the Letter of Guaranty. When Truetee
receives such a demand by Affidavit from a beneficiary, Trustee
shall immediately transmit a copy of such demand co Depot 1 tor,
and if Depositor fails to satisfy beneficiary, unjiess otherwise
enjoined by a competent court of law, fifteen d a w after the
mailing of such beneficiaiy's demand to Depositor], Trustee
shall place on the m&rKet for sale by suitable rekl estate
listing, all of the Truat Properties and from thef first
proceeds from the sale of the first unit to be solid and closed
o£ the Trust Properties, shall pay the demand of the demanding
beneficiary, as indicated by his Affidavit.
5.
As soon as all beneficiary demands and potential
demands have been met by Trustee, or as soon as the term of the
Escrow expires without demand by beneficiaries, all remaining
Trust Proportion shall be conveyed by Trustee's Deed back to
Depositui and the Escrow elosed.
ft. Truitee shall have the obligations tf reasonable
care with regard to the Trust Propertits and the terms and
conditions of this Escrow but, with the exception!of gross
uegligence or willful damaging acts* Trustee shall not be

-2-
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liable to Depositor or to the beneficiaries or afy of them vUft
regard to the Eeorow Age••ment end/or the Truit Iroperty.
DATED this

day fif July, 1969.
MARC DEVELOPMENT, X l C , an
Illinois £6r&»t'atioL

The Terms and Conditions of Escrow accepted. Tidltf to thB
foregoing Trust Property having been conveyed to {Trustee is
acknowledged.
HTGH COUNTRY WttEy

Millace Buchanan, President
55708
071189
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
In the Matter of the Arbitration between:
Arthur Mintz, Trustee of the Mintz
Family Trust, Claimant
-andMarc Development, a corporation. Respondent

CASE NUMBER:

81 115 0017 91
AMENDED AWARD OF ARBITRATOR

I, THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR, having been designated in accordance with the
Arbitration Agreement entered into by the above-named parties, and dated July
20, 1989, and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the parties, FIND and AVARD as follows:
Respondent, Marc Development, a corporation, is ordered to pay to Claimant,
Arthur Mintz, Trustee of the Mintz Family Trust, $188,500,00 plus interest at
10% from March 28, 1991 until paid. Provided, however, in lieu of paying the
foregoing award to Claimant, Respondent shall have the option of repurchasing
Unit 37 of The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley from Claimant, on or before May
30, 1991 for $588,500.00 in cash, the burden of giving notice to Claimant of
such election and arranging for closing being on Respondent. If Respondent
shall exercise this option, each party shall pay the closing costs customarily
allocated to buyer and seller, as applicable, but no real estate commission
shall be payable by Claimant. Claimant shall cooperate in effecting such a
closing.
The administrative fee and expenses of the American Arbitration Association
shall be borne by Respondent and paid as directed by the American Arbitration
Association. Each party shall bear their own expenses.
This Award
arbitration.

is

in

full

settlement

of

all

Dated this3f_*fcay of May, 1991.

000101

claims

submitted

to

this

OB MARC Construction & Development Cor
1629 Colonial Parkway

Inverness, Bnois 60067

(708)359-6024

fa*

7& 1&i

SW/

May 29,1991

Mr. Arthur Mintz
50FoxhiU
Woodside, California 94062
Dear Arthur:
This letter will serve as an agreement between Marc Development and Arthur Mintz for
Marc Development to purchase Lot 37 in the Bald Eagle Community of Deer Valley for
the purchase price of $588,500. The closing will take place on or before July 15, 1991,
and interest will be paid from May 30, 1991, at the rate of 2 points over Harris Bank of
Chicago's prime rate until the closing takes place. All custpmary closing costs will be
paid by the respective parties.-f30c fte*47fc*>C ASSUME exoc/uoD*t» s-lo
-?/.
In addition, it is agreed that the property will be listed for sale on the market
immediately with Janet Olch at a price to be determined by Marc Development
Sincere!

MarkO.
President
MOK:keo

uusr*^ M^rt

Agreed byV

Date: M*V 3o

(99/
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FAM/^Y

iwr

(415)851-1883

Res.

(415)851-8787

OFF.

July 16,1991
Mr. Hark 0. Kaplan
Marc Development
1629 Colonial Parkway
Inverness, Illinois 60067
NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND BREACH OF AGREEMENT
You are hereby notified that pursuant to the Arbitration Award
of the American Arbitration Association dated May 30, 1991,
and your subsequent letter agreement of May, 1991 extending
the terms for your payment for Lot #37, Bald Eagle Development,
you are in default in the purchase contemplated in our above
agreements.
All necessary documentation, deeds, title insurance and closing
statements were available for the closing with High Country Title
Company*
Accordingly, please be advised that your failure to honor the
above described payment committments has resulted in substantial
damage and inconvenience to the Mintz Family Trust which was
entitled to rely on your promise to pay.
By your failure to comply with your agreement, you have forfeited
any rights to reacquire Lot #37, and are responsible for payment
of $188,500 plus interest to July 15,1991 of $7724, plus interest
on $188,500 from July 15f199l to the date this debt is paid,
plus whatever additional costs and legal fees may be Incurred as
a result of your default.
I have advised High Country Title of this situation, and requested,
pursuant to the Deposit in Escrow, that they place for sale the
four lots held by them to protect beneficiaries , and to apply
the first recovered proceeds of a sale to the above described
amounts due the Mintz Family Trust.
This notice is not intented to excuse any action for damages
resulting from your default or breach of Contract.
MI&TT^FAMLCY tRU^T dtd 7-7-88
ARTHUR M. MINTZ, Tru stee £ — ^

